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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

HAv\TAIIAN EQUIPMENT COMPANY,
LIMITED, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.

VS.

7188

THE EIM,CO CORPORATION, a
corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMEN·T OF THE CASE

This is an action to recover damages for the refusal
of defendant to accept and pay for eertain personal property alleged by plaintiff to have been sold to defendant.
The pertinent allegations of the complaint are:
'' 2. That plaintiff and defendant entered
into an agreement in writing as follows: That
on or about August 8, 1946, the defendant offered and agreed to purchase from plaintiff, and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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on \)r about ~\ugus~t 9, 1946, the plaintiff accept~d
said offer and agreed to sell to defendan~-, cert~In
goods known and designated a.s pn.eunvattc ~eal1ng

ha1n1ners and chipping hammers for the price and
upon the tern1s and conditions hereinafter alleged.
(Italics ours)

''3. That the quantity and description of
said scaling ham1ners and chipping hammers,
\Yhich defendant agreed to purchase from plaintiff, as aforesaid, are as follows:
Sealing Hamm·ers
418 Mokel K-1
1250 Model FC
140 Model MM
4 Model "Super"
1 Model A

Ingersoll-Rand Co.
'Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.
Independent Pneumatic Tool Co.
Keller ·Co.
Dallet Co.

1813 Total
Chipping Hantmers
708 Model # 2
188 Model # 2
92 Model #200
22 Model #2

Master Pneumatic Tool Co.
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.
Ingersoll-Rand Co.
Keller Co.

1004 Total
''4. That defendant agreed to pay plaintiff
for each of said scaling hammers the sum of
Seventeen Dollars and Fif:ty Cents ($17.50), and
for each of said chipping hammers the sum of
Twenty-four Dollars ($2·4.00), f.o.b. Honolulu
Hawaii, making a total purchase price of Fifty~
five Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty-thre-e
Dollars and Fifty Cents ($'55,853.'50), which defendant agreed to pay plaintiff for said goods.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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It i~ alleged that defendant repudiated ~aid agreenlent and refused to accept said goods, and plaintiff
claimed as danta.ges the difference bet,veen the price it
is alleged defendant agreed to pay and the an1ount plaintiff 'Yas ab1le to realize fron1 the sale of said goods to
other persons. Defendant ans,Yered "ith a general denial,
a plea of the ~tatute of f"'rauds, and also ~et up seYera]
~pecial defenses not necessary to be considered.
Prior to sending said cablegrams, appellant had
certain telephone conversations 'vith resp-ondent to the
effect that the lTnited States Government 'vas offering
for sale in Honolulu certain surplus tools consisting of
pneumatic chipping hammers and scaling hammers. Aceording to appeUant's evidence, respondent represented
that ninety per cent of said tools 'vere of Ingersoll-Rand
manufacture (Rec. p. 233), and app,ellant indicated it
\Yas interested in these tools at fifty-five per cent of
government costs (Rec. 105, 234-5) and promised to cable
a bid (Rec. 234). "Exhibit A'' was thereup.on transn1i tted. It reads :
''Reference hammers bid maximun1 24 do1lars
each scalers $17.50 each Honolulu. Will take all.''
Appellant intended by said cablegram that respondent should make a bid to the government for said hammers at not to exceed the maximum prices designated
(Rec. 234-235 and 260), but respondent claims that said
cablegram was an offer to buy from resp,ondent. The
result of such divergent understanding of the purport of
said cablegram will appear in our argument.
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There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff.
This appeal is from said judgn1ent.
ASSIGNl\IENT 'OF ERRORS

1. The court erred in overruling appellant's objection
to the introduction in evidence of ''Exhibit A.'' (Rec.
p. 85).
I

2. The court erred in overruling appellant's objection
to the introduction in evidence of "Exhibit B." (Rec.
p. 86).
3. The court erred in overruling appellant's objection
to the introduction in evidence of ''Exhibit C.:' (Rec.
p. 86).
4. The court erred in overruling appellant's obj·ection
to the introduction in evidence of ''Exhibit D.'' (Rec.
p. 89).
5. The court erred in r~fusing to grant appel~ant's motion for a directed verdict. (Rec. p. 326).
6. The court erred in overruling appellant's motion for
new trial. (Rec. p. 62).

ARGUMENT
According to the foregoing allegations of the complaint, there was an offer by the ap~p~ellant and an ,acoeptanoe by the respondent which constituted the written
oo·n.tract, 'vhereby appellant agreed to buy cerrt·ain specified qu·antiti,es iof oertailn n~odels' of certla:im make.s olf scaling hammers and oertain specif~e~d qwantit:ie:s, models arnd
1nakes ~of chipping hammers. That is the contract alleged
to have been entered into, and as the value of the goods
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'vas up""ards of $500.00, and as no part of the goods was
accepted, it is. of cour~e, a contraet ••son1c ~note 0r ~nte'ln
o randunt · · of "yhich i~ required to be in writing under
Section 81-1-4 Utah Code Annotated. Under said statute,
such • · n1ote or 1nenrorandu1n in 1oritin.g .of the con,tract''
n1ust be · · si.gne-d by the party to be rhargecl,-in this case
the appellant.
The only· 'vriting required or that is competent, as
a con1pliance 'vith said statute is one ''signed by the
party to b·e cha.rged,'' and although it may he alleged
that the contract bet,veen the parties is ''in writing'' any
'vrit.ing signed by the party not sought to be charged
can be entirely disregarded as immaterial in defining the
tern1s or conditions of the contract. Its. only significa.nc.e,
anrl the only effecit it can have (assuming it to be formally sufficient) is to operate a.s an acceptance of the terms
and conditions of the offerer as contained in the ''memorandum'' signed by him.
1

In Bailey r. Lei.shn~an, 32 Utah 123, 89 Pac. 78, it is
held that under an allegation that the contract was in
u·riting, the acceptance could be shown by parol because
the'' 1nenl.oranclum in u~riting of the contract * * * signed
by th.e party vo b.e charg.ed'' is the partic.ular writing
which must embody all the terms of the contract.
See also 27 C.J. p. 277, Sec. 334 and cases cited.

1. THE COURT ERRED IN ~DMITTING IN
E\IIDENCE "EXHIBIT A." (Rec. 85.)
The contract relied on being within the statute of
frauds, all its terms must be contained in tbe "m~emorandum
in writing of the contract" signed by "the party to be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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charged" and the statem•ent of tbe terms must be co~plete,
d~efinite and certain. "Exhibit A" (the offer) is ambtgu~us
and is too uncertain and ·indefinite to m·eet these requirements.

Said ''Exhibit A'' is in words and figures as follows:
''Reference hammers bid 1naximum 24 dollars
each scalers 17.50 each Honolulu. Will take all.
(a) It contains no statement of either the quantities, kinds, n1odel or makes of either kind of hammers as
alleged in the complaint or at al1, and particularly no
statement that they were to he ''pneumatic'' scaling hammers or ''chipping'' hammers. The description of the
property is so incomplete and inadequate that it could
not possibly be identified without parol evidence.
(h) The words "Will take all" are ambiguous and
uncertain. They might mean'' all plaintiff had in stock''
or '' al1 plaintiff could buy'' or ''all plaintiff might elect
to sell.'' Therefore, the quantity or number of either
kind of hammer is· uncertain and could be made certain
only by parol.
(c) The words ''bid maximum'' do not import an
offer to buy. The only reasonable- meaning of such words
is that of an instruction or authorization to make bids
on behalf of the sender of the cablegram. Does th·e word
"bid" ordinarily mean "of£er~'' If so, it cannot well be
given that meaning when used in connection with the
word ''maximum.'' How can these .words he construed
as an offer by appellant to bwy for 24 dollars and 1'7.50
respective1y~ The statement of an "offer" to buy must
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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h~

so clea.rly expressed as to exclude any other construc-

tion. It 1nust not be subject to construction as an authorization of respondent to bid on behalf of appellant for
property offered for sale by the surplus property ag·ency
of the govern1nent. ''Exhibit A'' does not meet this test.
T·he phrase '"bid maximun1'' bears no other reasonable
construction than that it authorized r-espondent to bid
on behalf of appellant and to obtain the prop~erty (not
specifically identified) as cheaply as possible, but in
no event to bid above the maximum prices stated. Ap·pe1lant did not cable '~,ve bid 24 dollars each sealers 17.50
each.'' It cabled ''bid maximum.'' Why use the word
"maximun1 if appellant was making an offer to respondent~ The "~ord ''maximum'' cannot be disregarded.
This is a co1n1nercial transaction bet,veen traders and it
is a \\"ell established rule that in construing this class of
contracts every word must be taken into account.
In ·!\'rational Bank of Com1nerce v. Lamb-orn, (C.C.A.
4th Ct. 1~)24) 2 Fed. ( 2d) p. 23, the buyer bought a
quantity of sugar under a contract which contained this
term, "shipment to he made"" * *from Java by steamer
or steamers to Philade1phia.'' The sugar was loaded on
a vessel hound for Philadelphia. It developed engine
trouble w· hereupon another vessel containing the same
quality and quantity of sugar loaded at Java and destined for N e\Y York was diverted by the selleT to Philadelphia, and there tendered to t~e buyer within the time
stipulated by the contract. The buyer refused acceptance.
The court said :
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"It is a 1nercantile contract, and 1nerchants
are not in the habit of placing in their contracts
stipulation~ to which they do not attach some
value and importance.'~
Further in the opinion the court again says :
'' \Ve in the past have had mor·e than one
occasion to hold that in mercanti~e contracts the
courts 1nust give effect to every term in the bargain the parties have chosen to make, and are
'not at liberty to speculate whether they did or
did not attach importance to something they
'vrote. As, for example, in The Mahattan, 284 F.
310, we accepted as settled law that a purchaser
of grain to be shipped by one ship could not be
required to take it if it c.ame in another, and that
've could not inquire whether every possible purpose of the buyer would not be as well served by
that 'vhich was brought in the substitute. From
1nneh which was said by the tribunals which hav·e
heretofore passed upon 1he obligation of buyers
to aecept sugar from the. vVest Cheswald, it would
seem that it is at least possib1e that their conclusions were influeneed not a little by their nattural desire to prevent purchasers on a rapidly
falling market from escaping from a had bargain,
by taking advantage of a veriation from the ter1ns
for which they in fact cared nothing. Such considerations have much less weight in construing
and enforcing the agreements of business men
than the courts may properly give to them when
they are called upon to deal with contracts of a
less strictly mercantile character. In this respect
we can add nothing to what has been so forcibly
said in the quotations made from Mr. Justice
Gray in this country and from Lords ·Cairns and
Blackburn in England. Our examination of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cases \vhich in this country and across the wa,ter
have put a definite interpretation on the meaning of the "Tord. "ship1nent,' as used in contracts
of the rharacter of that \Yith w·hich \Ye are here
concerned, has convinced us that the instant case
is not distinguishable from then1, and is governed
by 'vhat the Supreme Court there said."
The court in that rase, anticipating that at first
blush. since the sugar \vas the same as to quality and
quantity, the ru'ling n1ight appear strained, offered this
illustration in order to demonstrate the danger of speculating as to 'vhether a given term used in a mercantile
contract 1nay be dee1ned to be 1nat.erial or not: Suppose,
said the court, the buyer had insured his shipment against
loss of profits, 'vould a policy of insurance covering a
ship1nent of sugar loaded on a vessel from Java destined
for .Philadelphia be good on a similar shipment loaded
on another vessel from Java destined for New York and
diverted to Philade'lphia ~ There was no insurance on the
ship1nent in this ease, but the court only used the illustration for the purpose of demonstrating that terms employed in a mercantile contract must be given effect
\vithout speculation as to whether the merchants employing the terms deemed them to be material or not.

In vflaggoner Refining Co. v. Bell Oil & Ga.s Co.,
(Okla.) 244 Pac. 756, the buyer ordered a number of
tank cars of gasoline, and in the printed portion of the
purchase order it was recited that the seller in fi'lling
~hipping orders should show the buyer as the shipper,
There \vas testimony· that the parties did not treat this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tern1 as n1aterial and that it w'as disregarded in prtor
shipments. The court said:
''This is what is denominated as: a mercan. tile contract, and courts are not permitted ~o
speculate as 'to the meaning of terms employed In
such contract, nor to attempt to determine why
certain terms are used; and the courts are bound
to give effect to the. terms which the parties have
chosen for themselves. Filley v. Pope, 6 S. Ct.
19, 115 U. S. 213, 29 L. Ed. 372.
''As said by the court in the case of National
Bank of Commerce v. Lamborn et al. (CCA) 2
F. (2d) 23, 36 ALR 509:
'' 'In construing mercantile contracts, courts
n1ust give effect to every term, and are not at
liberty to speculate whether the parties did or
did not attach importance thereto'."
It follows that the court must give effect to the word
''maximum;'' and when it does, the only construction
possible is that instead of the cable being an offer to
buy, it is in effect an authorization by appellant to respondent for the latter, as agent, to submit a bid to the
Surplus Property Office, Which ''bid'' should not exceed
the maximum price stated in the defendant's cable.
But should 've assume that the 'vords or terms used
in a "memorandum" are subject to more than one meaning, said ''memorandum'' is, by as strong a reason and
because of such ambiguity, insufficient as the basis for
a contract. As we have p~reviously stated, the statement
of an ''offer to buy'' must be so clearly ·eXp·ressed as. to
exclude any other construction. 'The memorandum is inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds unless the
'~offer·' is an offer to buy to the exclusion of an offer to
enter into any other relationship. The ''memorandum''
is insufficient if the offer is a1nbiguous and can be interpreted as \\~ell to be an instruction to an agent to
n1ake a bid to so1neone else. The follo\\''ing two authorities so hold:
In l{errin v. Biglane, (1fiss.) 110 So. 232, the written
n1en1oranduin ,,~as as follows :
''For the consideration of one dollar ( $1.00)
I hereby give 0. J. Biglane option on Lots 1 and
2."
Says the court:
"'It is perfectly manifest to us. that rit cannot he said fron1 a close scrutiny of this pap·er
whether it is a contract to lease, to sell, or to purrhase, and, if to lease, the time of the beginning
and end of 1he lease contract is not therein shown;
in other 'vords, the paper is so indefinite, so vague
-and uncertain that no one can tell what was intended to be done by the parties at the time of its
execution. Our court is committed to the doctrine
announced in Waul v. Kirkman, 27 Miss. 823,
'"'herein Mr. Justice Handy, as the organ of the
court, said :
'' 'The rule upon this point is 'veil settled to
be that the memorandum, in order to satisfy the
statute,. must contain the substantial terms of
the contract express-ed with such certainty that
they may be understood from the contract itself,
or some other writing to which it refers, without
resorting to parol evidence. Boydel1 v. Drummond,
11 Ea~t 143 (and other authorities.) For otherSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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\Vise all the danger of perjury, intended to ~e
guarded against by the statute, would be let In.
And \vhen reference is made in the memorandu1n
to another writing, it must be so clear as t~ prevent the possibility of the paper being substituted
for another. L. Sug. Vend., 94; Smith v. Arnold,
3 ~Iason (U.S.) 416, Fed. Cas. No. 13,004.'
"Under the above-quoted rule, it certainly is
a n1ost essential element that the contract state
or sho\v in some manner whether it is a contract
to s·ell or not, and whether a warranty deed or
quitclaim deed was to be executed or not. These
are just as essential e1ements as the purchase
price.
''The bill herein undertakes to explain and
supply these very essential elements of the contract, but the instrument itself is so uncertain as
to be absolutely void, because, by no stretch of
construction, from any language in the paper, can
it he said that it is an offer to sell."
In Osborne v. Moorie, (Tex.) 247 S. W. 498, the plaintiff offered in evidence a check for $100 on which there
was entered the following memorandum:
''To bind deal on · one block and six room
house on North Oak Street.''
The defendant objected to the introduction of the check
on the ground that the word ''deal'' might mean a purchase and sale, or it might mean a transaction of some
other character. Says the court:
''A 'deal' betw·een two parties includes any
transaction of any kind between them and when
applied to a transaction concerning a house or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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block does not in1ply an a.greetnent to sell or convey the san1e, and an endorsement on a check 'to
bind deal' in relation thereto may refer to an
agreement to sell or convey or it may refer to an
entirely different kind of transaction, as an agreeInent to rent or lease the property.
''The promise to sell or convey being an im·
portant element of a contract, parol evidence i~
not adtnissible to prove it as the real kind or
character of the transaction actua1ly agreed on
by the parties.''
In fVilliston on Contracts, Rev. Ed., \; ol. II, p. 1645,
Sec. 575, the author says:
''The property to which a sale, or contract to
sell, rela·tes must be described in the memorandum
with reasonable certainty. So, although the contract appearing in the memorandum seems to be
complete upon its fact, if, in fact, there were additional terms, the memorandum is insufficient
because the memorandum must s~tate the essential
tern1s of the oral con tract."
and in Sec. 578, p. 1656, the author states:
''The same kind of question arises in regard
to a description of the goods sold. They must
be sufficiently described for reasonable identification. A distinction should be noticed between
sales or contracts to sell epecific goods, and contracts to se ll goods of a certain kind. In a contract of the latter sort, a ·memorandum need be
no more definite than the contract. If the contract
is definite enough to be enforced, a memor~ndum
'vhich states the contract as it was made ~ill be
sufficient, while, on the other hand, if the memor1
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andlnn is more general than the actual contra~t,
the memorandum, though seeming good on _Its
face wil be insufficient because not fully s\tat1ng
the ~ontract the. parties made. WhJe,re, how·ever,
the s·ale or contrac.t 1'"e~ates t.o sp·eC'ific property,
there can be no question about lack of definiteness
in the contract iis·elf so far as concerns the property to which the bargain relates; the question is
- wholly whether the memorandum sufficiently describes this property." (Ita~ics· ours.)
"Exhibit A" is manifestly insufficient as a "memorandum in writing of the contract" in view of its
uncertanty and in view of its ambiguity (if it can possibly
be con~trued as an offer to buy) and when it is so completely lacking in a statement of all the terms of the
particular contract alleged in the complaint or of any
contract.
The deficiencies and uncertainties in ."Exhibit A"
cannot be cured, nor can the provisions of said exhibit be
supplem·ented either by "Exhibit B" or by paro'l.
In Lewis v. Elliott Bay Logging Company, (Wash.)
191 Pac. 803, the seller wrote :
"We let you have fir at $7-10-13 delivered
Everett or Seattle.''
The buyer replied :
' 'Your letter of the twenty-sixth instant is received in which you agree to let me ha¥e the raft
of fir logs, to be delivered in Seattle, by you at
$7 .00, $10.00, and $13.00, * * * and I will take the
. fir logs as per your offer at the. above prices.''
Held no contract; that the acceptance in specifying'' raft
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of fir logs'' could not render certain what was uncertain
in the offer. Says the court:
"The first question to be determined is
"~hether the letters referred to constitute a sufficient n1en1orandun1 to satisfy the statute of
frauds. One of the essentials of a memoranduin
under the statute is that it shall designate the subject tna tter of the contract.
''Considering, first, the letter signed by the
appellant, there is no designation therein of the
quantity, but the subject of the sale is reffered to
simply as 'fir.' The rule as stated in 1 Mechem
on Sales, Sec. 437, is that.' 'rrhe note or memorandum must also shO\V
\Yhat goods 'vere sold and in what quantities. This
rule requires that the goods shall be set out either
by name or by such description as will enable them
to be ascertained without other recourse to parol
evidence to identify the goods or apply the deseription of them.'
Under this rule it is neeessary that the
note or memorandum show in 'what quantities' the
goods are sold. In 25 R. C. L. 648, the ru'le is stated
substantially the same as in Mechem, and is as
follows:
'' ( 1)

'' 'In case of contracts for the sale of goods
the memorandum must designate with reasonable
certainty the subject matter of the sale, and where
the sale is of a quantity of a commodity the
quantity must be stated with reasonable certainty
as well as its kind.'
'' ( 2, 3) This ·rule requires that the quantity
be designated in the memorandum. The letter
'vri tten by the appellant, which referred to the
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subject rna tter of the sal~ as 'fir,' did not suf. .
ficien·t~y designate the quantity. The respondent,
ho\vever, argues that the two letters should be considered together. It is true that where the m-emo.randu.nt consists of telegrams or letters they may
be construed together, providing they are sufficiently connected by reference. In the letter of
the respondent the quantity of the subject matter,
namely, 'a ra£t of fir logs,' is for the first time
designated. Under the authoritie! above cited this
was one of the essentials of the m·emorandum.
'' ( 4) The question then arise, the memorandum of the appellant by which it is sought to be
charged not sufficiently describing the subject
matter, can it be held upon the letter of the respondent which for the first time contains that essential term of the contract~ Respondent cites a
nun1ber of cases upon this question, all of which
have been carefully read rand considered, but nonP
of them would sustain a holding that the appellant could he charged upon a memorandum which
it did not sign, and 'vhich designated the quantity,
where the writing signed by the appellant did
not sufficiently designate the subject matter in
that respect. ''
The rule

i~

thus stated in 17 C.J.S. p·. 364:

. ' 'It is essential to a con tract that the nature
and extent of the obligation be certain. If an agreement is uncertain, it is beoau.se the ;offier was uncertain o·r ambiguous to b.egin w·ith, for the acceptance is always required to be identical with
the offer or there is no meeting of minds and no
agreement. If the p·erson to whom the offer is
made sees the uncertainty and p-roposes a change
which will .make the agreement certain, this puts
an end to the offer.'' (Italics ours.)
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In 1Vorthhei;ner r. /{linger Jiills, (Ind.) 2:> N. E.
(2d) 246, the plaintiff alleg·ed the contract to be in writing consisting of t".,.o letters "~hereby defendant agreed
to se'll certain tin1othy and clover seed, which it is alleged
defendant failed to deliver. The 1nen1orandum (letters)
relied on, desc.ribed the seed as '' 100 Bags Full Timothy
1.50 per bu. 4 Bags White Blossom S. Clover 3.20 per
bu.'' etc., but the letters did not state the number of
bushels per bag, and there was no allegation or proof
that under trade usages a bag c.ontained any particular
nun1ber of bushels. Held the offer was insufficient and
that parol evidence could not be admitted to comp~ete the
contract b~.,. supplying the on1issio:n.
In Stanley r. A. Levy & J. Zentner Company, (Nev.)
112 Pac. (2d) 1047: 158 A.L.R. 76, the memorandum relied on signed by defendant was as follows:
"In reference to the purchase of International
truck by B. F. Stanley of the city of Reno, \Ve can
assure you that he wi~l have the hauling of 600
tons of wine grapes, the proceeds to be paid to you,
less $700 allowance for Mr. Stanley's operating
expenses. For your information Mr. Stanley will
be paid at the rate of $6 a ton.''
Held insufficient, in not stating whether the weight of
the grapes transported would be computed. on the net
weight or on the gross weight of the grapes and containers, and that parol evidence was not admissible to overcome the uncertainty. Says the court:
''The question is as to its sufficiency as a
note or memorandum to prevent the interposition
of the statute. It is the consensus of judicial
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opinion that··'such writing must contain all the
essential ele1nents of; the· contract~ ·The substantial parts ·of the contract 1nust be em~odied in
the· writing with such a degre·e of certainty as to
rriake~clear and definite the intention -of the parties
withou,t r'e.sort to oral evid.enQe. ·Manufacturer's
Light &·Heat Co. v. Lamp et al, 269 P. 517, 112
4-. 679; Seyrp.our v. O-elrichs, 156 Ca'l. 782, 106
P .. 88, 134Am. St. Rep. 154; 1\fentz v. Newwitter,
···122· N.Y. 491, 25 N.E. 1044, 11 L.R.A.-97, 19 Ain.
. St. Rep. 514; Snow v. Nelson, C.C., 113 F. 353;
,~5 O~J.· Sec~ 318; 25. R.C.L. 645, Sec. 276; 2 Williston on Contrac_ts, Re.v. Ed. 1619, 1622.
''The following forn1ula is stated in Restatement of
La'v Contrac:ts·, Sec. 207:
~:·

(

;

~

•

.

I

•

'

I

'

'' 'A niemor.andum, in orJ.er to make enforce, able a contract wirthin the statute, may be any
docum·ent or writing, formal or informal, signed
by the party to be charged-or by his agent actually
or apparently authoriz-ed thereunto, which states
with reasonable certainty, (a) eac:h party to ·the
contFact either by . his own name, or by such a
description ~s will serv·e to identify him, or by
the na~e or description of his agent, and (b) the
land, goods or other subject-mater to which the
contract relates, and (c) the terms and conditions
of all the. promises constituting the contract and
.. · by whom and to whom the promis~es are made.'
·' :
''Tested by the ru1e· stated it will be seen that
the: letter is deficient in .several respHcts. For in, stance, it is all·ege~ in the complaint and p~lain
tiff sought to prove, that the weight of the grap.es
tra.nsported would he· computed upon ~the gross
weight :of the ~grapes and boxes or their containers.
T·his· ·was contradicted by defendant, and Watt
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testified that the $6 per ton. :was to be paid on the
net "~eight. Whether it was to be net or gross
would have considerable bearing on, the profits
and 'vas an essential elen1ent of which no mention
is rnade in the letter. • * * We hold that the letter
in this case does not take the agreement out of the
statute of frauds.''
In Elli~ r. Denrer L. & G. R. C~o., (Cal.) 43 Pac. 457,
the men1ora.ndlun, so far as materia l here, was as follows:
1

''I will deliver f.o.b. cars at Denver, Co~o, you
to pay the freight, and deduct it frolll the purchase price, forty thousand ($40,000) dry red
spruce ties 6% to 8 inches thick, 6 to 9 inch face,
8 foot long, sawed ends, 15 p·er cent to be 5 to 6
inch face, tjes to be 60 cents each, and culls 40
cents eaeh. Dry and green white spruc-e same diInensions as above, 50 cents each. Red ·S·pruce ties
in ~ets at $20.00 per thousand foo1: board
1neasure. '
~

Says the eourt:
''The circumstance that the· nUmber 40,000
is mentioned concurrently with the specification of
red spruce ties does not operate to aid the contract and render i~t valid. The contract is to be
taken as an entiretv and indivisible, and "\Vhatever it contains must be taken to be parts of one
and the same thing, and we must, from all its
terms, be able to conclude what the p~arties had
agreed respecting each mentioned item. Scott v.
Railway Co., 12 l\1ees. & W. 31; Baker v. Higgins,
21 N.Y. 397; Clark v. Baker, 5 Mete. (Mass.) 452.
* * * Al'l agree that the terms of the bargain
rnust be so stated as to render it possible therefront to gather \vhat the parties haYe agreed to.
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Tested by this very general rule, whi~h is sufficient for our purpose, a simple inspect1o~ ?f the
1nemorandum will den1onstrate its insufficiency.
We are _unadvised by i~ts terms what number of
ties of the various descriptions were agreed to be
delivered by the eontracting p·arty. If the 40,000 is
referable only to the red spruce ties, then the
agreement is absolutely silent as to what the
parties contracted respecting the dry and green
white spruce, and the culls or the sets or the
lumber. If the number is to be taken as app[icable
to all rthe different varieties, we cannot ascertain
what part of' each the parties contracted for. There
is the same difficulty with respect to the number
of switch sets which were to be furnished, the
number of culls_ which were to be delivered, and
the an1ount of lumber which Dell was to supply.
There was no agreement to supply a certain definit.e thing, or a certain number of articles of a
particular description of the various sorts specified, nor did the railroad company agree to accept
specific articles of a given number or quantity.
If the company had brought suit against De11 for
the specific performance of the contract, it would
have found insuperable difficulty to furnish a
basis on which the court could decree a performance. Under these circumstances, the other p-arty
must be subject to a like difficulty when he brings
an aetion to recover damages for a failure to perform."
.
''A writing which does not specify the kind,
quality or quantity of the prop·erty sold is insufficient. A general description of an article
which may include several different kinds together with a s_tatement of the qua.n~tity or number
sold, is insufficient.'' 27 C. J. 274.
·
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2.

THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN
E\"IDENC~E ~'EXHIBIT B.'' Rec. 86.)
Said "Exhibit B" (the acceptance) is conditional and
not identical with the offer.

If, ho,vever, not,vithstanding the omission to specify
therein the property described in the complaint or to
identify any particular property, and if notwithstanding it does not, in terms, commit defendant to a proposal to · · buy'' anything from the respondent-if notwithstanding these defects-"Exhibit A" can, by any
possible construction, be held to constitute an offer to
buy, no contract was entered into, because there was
no acceptance. By ''Exhibit B, '' relied on as the acceptance, respondent attempted to do just what the buyer
attempted to do in the Lewis-Elliott Bay Logging Company case. It attempted to make certain that which was
uncertain, by the statement:
"In accordance your cable Hawaiian Equipment Company sells you subject delivery from
surplus approximately 992 chip·pitng hammers,
1836 scaling ha1nme.rs * * * f.o.b. Honolulu."
(Italics ours.)
Respondent could not by using the word ''sells'' thereby
import into the words "bid maximum" an offer to buy,
or by specifying the number of each kind of hammer,
make such specification a part of the '' memor,andum in
writing of the cont.ract," (Exhibit A) which is the only
writing signed by appellant and by which appellant
could be bound. By ''Exhibit B, '' r·espondent attempts
to amp1ify "Exhibit A," which is not permissible. It cannot be resorted to to supply deficiencies in ''Exhibit
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A.'' But even by· ''·Exhibit B '' none of the models or
makes, or the q:uality of e'ach kind, of hainmer set forth
in the complaint are mentioned. It does not constitute any
proof of the alleged contract for the sale and purchase
of the particular property described in the complaint.
'Furthermore, again ·assuming that ''Exhibit A'' was
an ''offer;" "Exhibit B" did not constitute an acceptanc-e because it was not an unconditional acceptance. The
statement:
''Hawaiian Equipment Company sells sub.iect to delivery from su.rpltts." (Italics ours.}
undertakes to obligate respondent only on condition that
delivery can be made or obtained from surplus. Suppose
after the ·exchange of cablegrams respondent had declined to deliver any hammers on the ground that there
was no ''delivery from surplus,'' (·w·hatever those '\Vords
mean), and ~uppose appellant had undertaken to recover for respondent's breach of the contract in failing to deliver the goods, could appellant have recovered f
Obviously not. Respondent would have claimed that its
response was not an acceptance but, because of the condition, was nothing more than a counter offer which had
not been accepted by appellant, and that theTe never had
been a meeting of minds. An acceptance must in no respect he at variance with the offer, but must be identical
with it and must be unconditional. As stated in 13 C.J.

281:
''An acceptance to be effectual must be identical '\Yi th the offer and uncondi tiona!. Where a
person offers to do a definite thing and another
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·· accepts conditionally or introduees a new tenn
into tl1e acceptance, his answer is either a mere
expression of ""il'lingness to treat
i,t js a kin.d
of proposal and in neither case is there 'an agreelllent. ''

.or

1

The following are a few examp1es:
.,,..,.here an offer was of the unexpired term of a lease
and the acceptance \Vas ''subject to obtaining the assent
of the lessor.'' Putrnan v. Grace, ( :n1:ass.) 37 N.. E. 16·6.
Where offer was to sell coke tins at a certain p·rice
and the acceptance \Vas by a telegram stating·: ''We accept your offer if full \Veight plates.'' Kirwan v. Byrne,
27 N.Y.S. 143.
Offer to sell land accepted "provided title
feet. Corcora.n v. White, (Ill.) 7 N. E .. 5.25.

~s per~

An acceptance of an offer to sell crude oil at 15°
gravity with a.ded stipulation that it must be of that
gravity at 60° farenheit' '·does not create a binding contract. Fo1tr Oil Co. v. United Oil Prod!ucers, (Cal.) 79
Pac. 366.

An acceptance of an offer to sell land conditioned on
approval of title by purchasers' attorney. Richa,rdson v.
Warehouse Co., (N.C.) 26 S. E. (2d) 897.

Offer to sell land accepted with demand of delivery
of "good and sufficient title." Larndrum v. Jordan, ·
(Okla.) 229 P·ac. 182. Flog·el v. Dowling, (Ore.) 102 Pac.
178.

An acceptance by seller, of offer to buy which stipulates that .prop·erty is sold ''subject to passageway rights,
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:party wall agre.ements etc." Lawrence v. Rosenberg,
(~!ass.) 130 N. E.l89.
An offer to sell ice which does not specify time of
payment contemplates .payment on delivery, and an acceptance : ''Will take the ice ; commence loading Monday. Will weigh and setfle promptly'' is not an unconditional acceptance. Rogers v. French, (Iowa.) 96 N. W.
787.
See also Bell Clothes Shop v. Kamber, 197 N.Y.S.
244.
In Edwards v. Schaw·no, 247 N.W. 465, the seller
telegraphed to the buyer an offer to sell ''one thousand
hags of po,vdered mille'' The buyer telegraphed acceptance but added that the milk was to be of" first quality."
At the trial there was testimony introduced to the effect
that in a 1ong distance telephone negotiation preceding
the telegrams of offer and acceptance, it was understood that the quality of the milk was to be "first class."
The court said :
"Undisputed evidence of correspondence and
telegran1s held to show no enforceable contract
for sale of milk powder (St. 1931, Sec. 121.04 (1).
" . .t\fter defendant's offer to sell, plaintiff
made counter offers· which were not accepted by
defendant, and the negotiations, therefore never
ripened into an enforceable contract;
'
''Purported acceptance of offer to sell adding qualifications, amounted to counter-off~r and
did not complete contract.''
'

'

It is also p-ertinent to remark that there is nothing
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in the '• memorandum • * • signed by the party to be
charged, indicating· that it had any understanding of
\vhat \Yas intended by ''delivery fron1 surplus.'' If the
1ueaning of these \vords might have been shown by parol
they could not be injected into the ''memorandum'' to
1nake it read that appellant offered to buy "if resp~on.dent
could secu.re delirery from surplus.'' Furthermore,
·'Exhibit B'' states that respondent'' sells approximately
992 'chipping' hammers and 1836 scaling ham1ners. ''
Does such language constitute an unconditional response to
the 'vords of "Exhibit . A. "when "Exhibit A" says nothing
about ''chipping'' hammers and does not specify what
quantity appellant offers to buy, or use any words from
which, without parol evidence, the number of hammers
of each kind could be determined~ ·The meaning of the
words ''Will take all'' is so uncertain as to require parol
evidence, which is not permis~ible.
There is yet another reason why there was no contract in this case. ''Exhibit A'' fixes maximum price
''Honolulu." "Exhibit B" says "f . o.b. Honolulu." Free
on board what~ "Exhibit A" says nothing about "f.o. b."
If appeliant intended to accept delivery at Honolulu, not
free on board any transportation line, which is the only
construction that can be placed upon the word ''Honolulu,'' and if respondent had placed the merchandise
on board some line of its own choosing and a loss occurred, would appellant have sustained such loss, when
it had not specified f.o.b. in its so-called offer~ The uncertainty about delivery is clearly apparent from ''Exhibit D '' for the respondent 8tates therein:
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''we are doing everYthing possible to move
this equipment to you as soon as possib'le.
.
Our presu'mp~tion is you want it sent to E1mco
Corporation, Salt Lake City.'' (Italics ours.)
Nothing in "Exhibit A" suggesting shipment to Salt
Lake City. Nothing more than delivery at Honolulu can
be read into "Exhibit A." Respondent also says in "Exhibit B:"
''We consider this exchange of cables above
mentioned and this confirming letter the equivalent of delivery.''
Why? Beacuse respondent realized it had no authority to
make delivery f.o.b. any line, and as no place of delivery
in Honolulu was specified by appellant, respondent atten1pted to declare a sort of constructive de livery. The
uncertainty as to the quantity of tools is likewise apparent from "Exhibit D," for respondent states:
1

''Will give you final account of exact number of tools shipped."
There had been, of course, no written contract whereby
appellant bound itself to buy the number to be thus ascertained by the final account or to buy the particular
nu1nbers, names and n1odels alleged in the comp:laint or
any specified number or kind. There had been no number ascertained when ''Exhibit B'' \vas sent (respondent
used the word "approximately") or when the "memorandum'' was signed, and resort to parol would have
been necessary to explain the meaning of ''Win take all.''
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This is not a case in which appellant welched from
a bargain, as respondent attempts to establish. It is
rather a case \Vhere respondent attempted to fasten on
appellant an obligation which it was never appellant's
intention to assume. When respondent received the cable
''bid maximum," with what haste it replied: "Hawaiian
Equipn1ent Company sells you'' etc., not property respondent ow"ned; not property which had been seggregated or identified; not property, the quantity of which
had been detern1ined (quantity was to be determined on
final account-See "Exhibit D"), but property which
respondent intended to acquire. However, respondent
played safe. If it obtained the property, it wou1d insist
there was a sale, make a large profit above what the
government was quoting the price of hammers. (See
"Exhibits 1, 3, 4 and 5".) If it did not obtain the property, it could say: ''Our response to your offer was that
we sold you subject to delivery f,om surplus;'' therefore,
we only obligated ourselves conditionally.
From May 16, 1946, the Surplus Property Office of
the Department of Interior in Honolulu had advertised
to the public these hammers for sale at fixed prices of
$18.00 for chippers and $15.00 for sca~ers. (See Exhibit
3). Anyone could have bought them through June, July
and August at these prices. This, Hawaiian Equipment
Company did not disclose to Eimco.
Horeover, on August 5, 1946, the Surplus Property
Office op·ened these goods to negotiated sale for prices
other _than· the foregoing fixed prices. (See Exhibits 4
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ment hurried over to Surplus and bought for the fixed
prices of $18.00 and $15.00 (See Exhibit 1), and then
sent ''Exhibit B'' attempting to thrust upon Eimco a
contract to buy them at '$24.00 and $17.50; whereas,
Eimco thought they were instructing Hawaiian Equipment Company to bid for Eimco and to get the goods as
cheaply as possible.
This action smacks of bad faith when respondent so
precipitately attempted by "Exhibit B'' to absolutely
bind appellant to buy while only conditionally binding
itself to sell and deliver. Did not the words ''bid maximum,'' suggest something different from" offer to buy1"
How easy it would have been by further exchange of
cablegrams for respondent to make definite and certain
just what appellant intended rather than to hastily reply
to the cable "bid maximum," "Ha-\vaiian Equipment
Company sells." "Exhibit B'' is an acknowledgment that
"Exhibit A" did not say enough. If it clearly contained
an offer to buy, respondent could have replied: "Your
offer accepted." But with intent to commit appellant to a
sale and to make certain the kind of a contract to which
it wished to bind appellant, respondent cabled: "Hawaiian Equipment Company sells,'' and then it hedges with
the words "subject delivery from surplus." It is too
apparent from Exhibits A and B that there never was a
valid contract between the parties.
3. THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING· IN
E'TJDENCE "EXHIBIT C." (Rec. 86.)
This exhibit could not possibly constitute a part
of the contract. It is not a part of respondent's so-called
acceptance and was immaterial.
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THE COURT ERRED IN AD~IITTING IN
E'"'IDENl~E '•EXHIBIT D" (Rec. 89).
-!.

This letter does not purport to be a pa.rt of any
contract, but i~ a mere confirnuzfi,on of the cablegrams
between the parties after the so-called offer and acceptance had been transmitted.
e assun1e respondent will
claim nothing 1nore for it. It could not, of course, aid or
amplify the insufficient '• nz.emoravndurn'' or in any way
bind appellant by its explanations about the necessity for
making a ''physical count'' of the hammers or about
•' ~teamer space," or respondent's "presumption'' or by
the statement that appellant's "purchase of this equipment was on an f.o.b. Honolulu basis." Neither could
appellant be bound by respondent's statement that it
considered the cablegrams and the letter (Exhibit D)
"the equivalent of delivery.'' If no contract resulted
from '·Exhibits A and B," "Exhibit D" was not competent to create one. Said exhibit was immaterial for it
could in no wise constitute a part of the so-called contract, all the terms of which were required to be embodied
in some written memorandum'' signed by the party t'O be
charged.'' This exhibit was, therefore, improperly admitted.

'T

5. THE COURT ER.RED IN REFU·SING· TO
DIRECT A VERDICT FOR THE APPEL·LANT AND
IN REFUSING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MO·TION
FOR NEW ·TRIAL. (Rec. 326, 62.)
These assigned errors go to the same question as
the errors in admitting in evidence ''Exhibits A and B ''
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and also to the question of the insufficiency of the evid€nce to sustain the verdict, one of the grounds of the
motion for new trial.
If ''Exhibits A and B'' were improperly admitted,
of course, plaintiff had no case and the authorities we
have cited support that contention. Without these exhibits or even with them, there was likewise a failure
'
to prove the allegations of the -complaint .. Se-c. 104-14-2,
U.C.A. contains, among others, the provision:
'

' 'Where * * * the allegation of the claim * * •
to which proof is directed is unproved, not in some
particular or particulars only but in its general
scope and meaning, it is not to be deemed a case
of variance, but a fai'lure of proof."
We again make
complaint:

refei~ence

to the allegations of the

"That plaintiff and defendant entered into
an agreement in writing as follows: tha,t on or
about August 8, 1946, the defen~ant offe.red and
agree-d to purchase from plailntiff, and on or ~about
A1tgttst 9, 1946, the plaimtiff accepl;,e:d said offer
and iagr~eed t;o sell to defenda-nt certain goods
kno,vn and designated as pvneurY/)(})tw scaling hamTilers and chipping hammers for ~the price and
upon the terms and conditions hereinafter alleged." (Italics ours.)
Then follows a specification of the quantities, n1odels
and makes of scaling hamn1ers and a like sp-ecification as
to chipping ha1nmers. .
If, as we have shown, respondent must neeessarly
rely on "Exhibit A'' as the "me1no-randum in u,rif:intf
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of the co·ntract * * * signed by the pa1·ty to be charged"

for proof of a.ll the tern1s of the eontract., of cour:se, it
is a.ppa.rent that said h Exhibit .A." is no proof whatever
of the contract alleged in the complaint. The contract
alleged is not proved even if ·'Exhibit B'' could be
resorted to to arnplify "Exhibit A", which is not perInissible. Even with said Exhibits, there is a complete
failure of proof. Without them, if the court erred in
admitting them, respondent has not the semblance of a
ca.se, for said exhibits are insufficient as an offer (''memorandum in writing of the contract") or as an acceptance, and therefore, there was no contract. It obviously
is unnecessary to further argue so self-evident a proposition.
THERE 'VAS NO ~IEE·TING OF ~fiNDS
There is however, yet another reason why the court
erred in refusing appellant's motion for a directed verdict and in overruling appellant's motion for new trial.
The evidence affirmatively shows there was no contract
because there was no meeting of minds on what was intended hy the cablegram, "Exhibit A". The words "hid
maximum'' are clearly indicative of an authorization of
plaintiff to bid for and on behalf of 'defendant, as stated
by Joseph Rosenblatt. He testified:

Q.

Did you tell, did you Mr. Rosenblatt, in that
conversation, tell, in the last conversation
with Mr. B1ades and l\{acNaughton, tell them
you were buying fron1 them~

A.

I did not tell them I was buying from them.
They didn't offer me anything.
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Q.

What did you tell them~

A. I told them we would get a bid 'vhich they
could submit to surplus." (Rec. 260) (See also
Rec. 234.)
If, for the sake of argument we assume that respondent, in good faith interpreted the cablegram as an
offer to buy (which we regard as an entirely erroneous
interpretation), this is proof of its ambiguity. The minds
of the parties did not n1eet and there was, therefore,
no contract, and the court, as a rna tter of law, should
have so held. The applicable rule of law is that when
the parties have a different understanding as to the
meaning of ambiguous language, or of language which
may be given more than one construction, there is no
contract, since the minds of the parties have not n1et.
In his treatise on Contracts, Williston states the
rule as follows:
''Though it is true that a party to a contract is bound by his express language, and cannot contradict the meaning of his words by denying that he intended this meaning, he is not bound
by the interpretation which may be placed on ambiguous language unless he was himself blameworthy in permitting the ambiguity, or even then
if the other party to the transaction is equally
b1an1eworthy in not detecting the ambiguity. If
every word and every act had but one permissible
meaning, it -vvould never be necessary in considering the formation of contracts to inquire into the
intent of the speaker or actor; but since this is
not the case, if an expression, in view of the circumstances under which it was used, may fairly
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1nean either of two things, each party is a.t liberty
to attach his own meaning, at least unless he was
in son1e "~ay responsible for the other party' Inistake. This result has been summarized in the ·R.estateinent of Contracts: (Sec. 71).
" 'Except as stated in Sees. 55, 70, the undisclosed understanding of either party of the
n1eaning of his O\Vll words and other a0ts, or of the
n1eaning of the other party's words and other acts
is n1aterial in the formation of contracts in the
follo,ving cases and in no others :
" · (a) If the manifes~tations of intention of
either party are uncertain or ambiguous, and he
has no reason to know that they may bear a different meaning to the other party from that which
he hin1self attaches to them, his n1anifestations
are operative in the formation of a contract only
in the event that the other party attaches to ~them
the same meaning.
'' '(b) If both parties know or have reason
to kno". . that the manifestations of one of them are
uncertain or ambiguous and the parties attach
different 1neanings to the manifestations, this difference prevents the uncertain or ambiguous manifestations from being operative as an offer or an
acceptance.
'' ' (c) If either party knows that the other
does not intend what his words or other acts express, this knowledge prevents such words or
other act from being operative as an offer or an
acceptance.'
''Such an error in ~anguage may relate ~to
the object to which the apparent agreement relates, to the p·erson with whom it was made, or
to any of its terms." Willison on C-ontracts, 298301.
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See Anson on Contracts, p. 156; Williston on Sales.
Sec. 5; 12 Am. Jur., p. 518, (Sec. 21 Contracts); Holmes,
The Common Law, p. 309; 6 Eng. Ruling Cases, p. 200201; Pollock on Contracts, pp. 504, 505; Pomeroy on
Contracts, Sec. 251 ; Kerr on Fraud and 1\listake, 5th
Ed. pp. 548, 549 and cas·es cited.
The famous leading case on the point is the early
case of Raffles v. WichelhatUs (1864), 2 H & C 906. There
the parties supposedly agreed for a charter party "Ex
Peerless" to sail from Bombay to England. It subsequently hecame apparent that there were two ships named
Peerless, one of which sailed from Bombay to England
in October, the other which sailed in December. One of
the parties had contracted with reference to the ship
having the early sailing date, the other in good faith
kne"r only of the latter. The court held that since each
party \Vas mistaken as to what the other party believed,
and inasmuch as there was a latent ambiguity in the
alleged agreement, each was entitled to insist upon his
oV\rn interpretation of the agreement, and neither could
enforce the contract against the other. There "\Vas no
nteeting of the minds and hence nothing for the court
to enforce. The principle of this case has been followed
repeatedly by English and American courts. The facts
in this case are repeated as an illustration to Sec. 71
of the Restatement, and the case itself has been repeatedly cited and followed by text 'vriters and judges in
this country.
Another fan1ous case is Falck v. Williams (1900)
Appeal Cases 176. Here plaintiff and defendant had
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been engaged in an exchange of messages in code through
a third person acting as broker. A eypher telegra1n wa.s
sent "Tithout punctuation as an alleged acceptance of
previous offers. The meaning of the telegram depended
upon whether one particular word was read with the
'vords that preceded or followed it. Interpreted one
way the co.:rmnunication referred to a shipment of shale
fron1 Sidney to Barcelona; the other interpretation had
reference to shipping· copra from Fiji to Europe. The
parties differed in their interpretation and the court
held that since there 'vas no reason why one meaning
'vas more certain than the other, and since in good faith
the sa1ne a.1nbiguous language could reasonably be interpreted in two different 'vays, there was no contract.
. A.1nerican decisions are squarely in line with R1ajfles
v. Wichelhaus, supra. In Cile v. Cavanagh (1869), 103
Mass. 356, 4 Am. Rep. 560, there was an agreement
for the sale of a certain lot on ''Prospect Street, Waltham." There were two streets in \Valtham known as
Prospect Street. The jury was instructed that if the
parties had in mind different streets there could be no
contract and the app·ellate court affirmed the decision.
In Wiwnemucoa Watetr and Light C:ompamy v. Moihel
Gas Engine Works, (1913), 179 Ind. 542, 101 N.E. 1007,
an action was brought to recover part of th·e purchase
price on a contract for the sale of an engine from
appellee to app·ellant, and for damages for alleged breach
of guarantee. Among the specifications of the engine
was the following: ''Horse power develop,ed at 275
R.P.M. 150 actual horse power." It appear·ed that only
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as high as 125 horse power \Vas attained a.t the place
where performance was expected. Plaintiff claimed that
150 horse power working efficiency was guaranteed;
defendant claimed that the guaranteHd horse power was
subject to the deductions of loss of horse power from
friction, and that it was so understood in the trade. The
court held, as to the meeting of the minds,
''If it (the case) resolved itself into the situation that one of the parties means and intends
one thing, and the other party means and intends
another, it is manifest that the first element of
a contract, the mutual meeting of the minds of the
parties is lacking·, and there is no contract.''
In Indiana Ft~Jel and Supply Company v. Indianapolis
Basket Company, 41 Ind. Appeals 658, 84 N.E. 776,
'vhich was a suit on an alleged agreement for the sale
of a certain kind of coal described as ''Indiana Egg,''
the offeror thought the coal was to be screened only
once; the offeree expected that it was to be screened
t\vice. Both interpretations were reasonable, since the
two kinds of coal were both kno\vn to the industry by
the same name. Held, there was no contract hecause·the
language used was susceptible to two meanings.
In Mum1nerhojf v. Ra1nda.ll, 19 Ind. Appeals 44,
40 N.E. 40, the stenographer of an alleged offeror made
an error in transcribing and the offeree thought the
"Triter \vas offering to sell potatoes at 35c pe-r bushel
instead of 55c, as the former dictated. The court held
there was no contract, since there was no meeting of
n1inds.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37
In Cage r. Black, ~l7 .A.rk. 613, 134 B.\:v. 942, defendant offeretl plaintiff 200 ~arks of rice ~ '$5.75 FOB.''
Plaintiff understood the price "Tas per sack. Defendant
nnder~tood that the p-rice "'"as per barrel. There was
evidence that both measures 'vere used in the trade.
Held there \Vas no contract. In this case, however, the
court decided that when the plaintiff accepted the rice
after learning of defendant's intention, a contract came
into being at that time upon the terms understood by
lefendant.
In Sn.oderly c. Bower, 30 Ida. 484, 166 Pac. 265, a
written agreement provided that certain hay was to be
measured according to the ''Government Rule.'' Held,
that evidence could be introduced to disclose the fact
that there were several rules known as the "Government
Rule,'' and that the parties did not intend the same
thing, and that inasmuch as the minds of the parties
did not intend the same thing, and that inasmuch a.s
the minds of the p~arties did not meet as to what '' Government Rule" was to be employed, no contract existed.
In a ~finnesota case, X showed plaintiff a lot which
he told plaintiff that defendant wanted to sell. The lot
X showed to plaintiff was in fact not owned by defendant, although it was on the same street as another lot
which defendant did own. X was simply mistaken as
to the identity of the lot. Plaintiff and defendant agreed
orally for the sale of a lot, each referring to a different
one. Held, no contract existed since the minds of the
parties never met. Citing Raffles v. Wichelhaus, supra,
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and Gile v. Cavanagh, supra. Strong v. Lane (1896),
66 Minn. 94, 68 N.W. 765.
In P~e~rless Glass C·ompany v. Crockett Tinware Co.,
(Cal.), 54 Pac. 101, the seller giving terms stated that
the ''freight allowance'' was 74c under the belief that
he was answering an inquiry concerning the freight rates.
The buyer understood the term to mean an allowance
of 74c per 100 pounds from the invoice price. The
California Suprem·e Court held that the buyer was not
entitled to any reduction, there having been no contract
because of the failure of the meeting of the minds of the
parties.
In Tyng v. C·onstwnt-Loraine Inv. Co., 47 Utah 330,
the plaintiff in good faith believed he was contracting
to buy, and to receive a warranty deed for, a lot on
State Street in Salt Lake City 55 x 165 feet. Defendant
intended to sell 53lf2 x 165 feet by warranty and 10 x 16'5
feet by quit-claim deed. Plaintiff sought return of
$1000.00 paid by him on the purchase price and asked
the court to instruct the jury that if they found there
was a misunderstanding between the parties and no
meeting of minds, then there 'vas no contract and defendant should return the monev. The trial court refused
to submit this question to the jury, and for that reason
the case 'vas reversed. Says the court:
oJ

"As to the plaintiff's understanding of the
ambiguity, and in what sense he regarded the contract, there are two views : One is, that ht understood and regarded it in the sense that the defendant unders,tood it and as tendering by its conveyance, whatever property was owned by it on
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the '"e~t ~ide of State Street. If so, then the 1ninds
of the parties met; then did the difendant tender
a deed in accordance "Ti th the agreement; and
then """as there no breach and no obligation to return the $1,000. The other vie"' is, that the plaintiff understood the a1nbiguity to Inean a conveyance by 'varranty of fifty-feet. If so, then the
n1inds of the parties did not meet; then was there
no contract; and then was the plaintiff entitled
to a return of the $1,000 paid by him, not on the
theory of any breach of contract, bu~t of money
had and received. ''
Upon the retrial, the issue of whether the minds of
the parties met \Vas submitted and the jury found for
the plaintiff. On the next appeal (50 Utah 1, 8) this
court remarked:
''If, as the jury found, the minds of the parties did not meet upon soine essential elements,
then it must follow that no contract was entered
into by the parties, and hence the defendant retains the $1000.00 of p1aintiff's money without
right or authority of la,v.''
It is not difficult to apply the rule in these cases
to the case at bar. The words "bid maximum" can,
and we think ought to he interpreted to mean "you bid
maximum on our behalf," and that is what appellant
meant (Se.e Rec. 2'60.) Respondent, we think, erroneously, interpreted the words to mean ''defendant bids,''
disregarding the word ''maximum.'' Therefore, it affirmatively appears from the evidence that there was no
meeting of minds.
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~fay

we in conclusion summarize:

(a) If there is an enforceable eon tract in this case,
it u1ust be found in the two cablegra1ns, ExhibitR A and
B. Defendant's cablegram, Exhibit A, "~as sent August
7, 1946, plaintiff's, Exhibit B, on August 9, 1946, and
these cablegrams constitute the alleged ''agreement in
writing" and are the alleged offer and acceptance referred to i~ paragraph 2 of the complaint. (Rec. p. 1).
There is no '' 1nemorandun1'' other than Exhibit A signed
by appellant and as before stated, the sale involves
goods of a value in excess of $500.00.
(b) The "memorandum" must set forth an offer
to buy. It does not do so. The statement of the offer
to buy must be so clearly expressed as to exclude an
interpretation that any other than an offer to purchase
is intended. It must not be subject to the construction
that it is an instruction to respondent to bid, on behalf
of appellant, for property offered for sale by the government. ''Exhibit A'' does not meet this test, for its
phraseology clearly implies an authorization to respondent to bid on behalf of appellant, and to obtain the
property (without specification) as cheaply as possible,
but in no event to bid above the maxin1um prices stated.
The term ''bid maximum'' bear~ no other reasonable
construction. Appellant did not cable: "bid" or "offer";
it cabled "bid maxin1urn". The vvord "maximum" cannot be disregarded in this, a commercial transaction.
(c)

The '' n1emorandum'' lacks certainty as to the
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property involved. It contains no description of the
quantities, 1nodels or n1akes alleged in the -c(nnplaint or
any quantities, n1a.kes or Inodel.s ..
(d) Even if "Exhibit ...:\." 1s an offer (which we
_deny), the alleged acceptance "Exhibit B" is not an
unconditional, but a conditional acceptance, ''on delivery
of property from surplus.''
(e) \'Exhibit B'' attempts to amplify and to inject
new tern1s by specifying (approximately) the number
of each kind of hammer importing the word'' pneumatic''
and the word "chipping" when appellant had used no
such terms.
(f) Even if "Exhibit A" is an off,er, "Exhibit B"
attempts to inject a new term by the statement ''f.o.h.
Honolulu'' when no such proposal was included in or
justified by "Exhibit A".

(g) Appellant asserts that "Exhibit A'' is not an
offer to buy and that it could not, in good faith be~ tso
regarded. If however, the court should hold that it could
be so construed, we contend that it is also subject to being
construed as an authorization to bid on behalf of a:ppellant and being ambiguous and appellant intending one
thing and respondent in good faith (if it acted in good
faith) intending another, th~re was no meeting of minds
and therefore no contract.
We respectfully submit that the motion for directed
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verdict should have· been sustained and that the judgment should be reversed.
Respectfully' submitted,
WILLIS W. RITTER
JESSE R. S. BUDGE
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant
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